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CASES NOTED
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT: A MEANS TO CIRCUMVENT THE
CRIMINAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The appellant filed suit for divorce, setting forth a false address for
his wife in his complaint and affidavit for constructive service. Appear-
ing in the Dade County Circuit Court, he testified that he was sending
his wife from $250 -to $350 per month and that she knew about the
divorce suit. Three years later, the appellee-wife filed a petition request-
ing the court to issue a contempt order for appellant's failure to make
child support payments of $7,000, and the court issued an order to show
cause for failure to comply with the divorce decree. At the hearing be-
fore the court, when appellant was absent but represented by counsel,
appellee testified that she had never received child support payments,
that her husband had sent her to Peru, and that she did not know she
had been divorced until so notified by her lawyer. When the hearing was
recommenced, appellant appeared without counsel and admitted that his
previous testimony had been false, whereupon the court vacated the
divorce decree and sentenced him to 60 days for criminal contempt. Ap-
pellant con-tended that he was guilty only of indirect rather than direct
criminal contempt, and that he could not be punished for contempt be-
cause the statute of limitations for the crime of perjury had run before
any party had moved to vacate the final decree. On appeal to the Third
District Court of Appeal, held, affirmed: The contempt was direct because
it was committed in the presence of the court and therefore governed by
the procedural requirements of Rule 1.830, Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure.' The court held, inter alia, that the statute of limitations for
perjury was no bar to the contempt punishment. Chavez-Rey v. Chavez-
Rey, 213 So.2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
The issue here presented, one of first impression in Florida, is
whether a crime barred from prosecution by the statute of limitations
is punishable when relabeled "direct contempt." The decision of the
Third District means that -the substantive right to the protection of the
statute of limitations can be circumvented by use of the contempt pro-
1. FT-a. R. CRm. P. 1.830:
A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the court saw or heard the
conduct constituting the contempt committed in the actual presence of the court.
The judgment of guilt shall include a recital of those facts upon which the adjudica-
tion of guilt is based. Prior to the adjudication of guilt the judge shall inform the
defendant of the accusation against him and inquire as to whether he has any
cause to show why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt by the court and
sentenced therefor. The defendant shall be given the opportunity to present evidence
of excusing or mitigating circumstances. The judgment shall be signed by the judge
and entered of record. Sentence shall be pronounced in open court.
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cedure. Therefore, what cannot be done directly can be done indirectly,
through the issuance of a criminal contempt citation.
In support of its decision the court relied on only one case, Tracy
Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co.2 There the defendant
had offered false testimony in a previous suit for divorce, disclaiming
ownership of property which he now claimed. His opponents, none of
whom included his former wife, sought an estoppel based on the divorce
suit to prevent defendant from asserting his ownership. The Supreme
Court of Utah denied the estoppel, rationalizing that the truth in a later
action is preferable to an estoppel when there has been no reliance on
previous false testimony. The Utah court declared that the defendant
was not beyond the reach of a citation for contempt, even though the
statute of limitations had run against any perjury that might have been
committed in the divorce action.
It is not clear whether the court in Tracy intended punishment for
criminal contempt. No criminal contempt action was ever instigated
against the defendant, even in a subsequent suit initiated by his former
wife for back alimony.8 The most that can be said is that reference to
the statute of limitations in Tracy was dictum, which was not translated
into law when the opportunity arose in the subsequent suit for back ali-
mony.
Florida courts may cite persons for contempt when they perjure
themselves.4 For perjury to be punished as direct contempt, however,
there are three requirements: 1) there must be an obstructive effect, 2)
the court must have judicial knowledge of falsity, and 3) the question
must be pertinent to the issue.'
Although criminal contempt has been classified as a proceeding in-
herent in the court,6 rather than a crime or a criminal case, there has
been no difficulty for all the federal courts and a majority of the state
courts which have directly decided the issue to determine that time limita-
tions do indeed govern the courts' power to sentence for direct con-
tempt.7 Furthermore, criminal contempt has recently been defined by
the Supreme Court of the United States8 as a crime in the ordinary sense,
punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both.
2. 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388 (1942).
3. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943).
4. Parham v. Kohler, 134 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
5. State ex rel. Laramie v. Boggs, 151 So.2d 456 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). In a prior
case, Vega v. Vega, 110 So.2d 29 (3d Dist. 1959), the Circuit Court of Dade
County refused to hear a motion to vacate a decree which was obtained through
the husband's perjured testimony in a previous ex parte proceeding in which he
falsely testified that he did not know his wife's whereabouts. The complaining
divorced wife was cited for contempt when the court learned by inquiry that she
had lived with her husband two months prior to rendition of the divorce. The
Third District reversed, stating that the court should have ruled only on the
husband's fraud, and that there was no basis to inquire into the wife's motives in
bringing the perjured testimony to the court's attention. Vega is almost on point
with Chavez-Rey, yet no criminal contempt citation as to the husband was discussed.
6. Ballengee v. State, 144 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
7. Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 439 (1965).
8. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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The trend in the Supreme Court's decisions establishing the time
restriction on the power to sentence for past offenses began in 1805. In
Adams v. Woods the court said:
In a country where not even treason can be prosecuted after a
lapse of three years, it could scarcely be supposed that an in-
dividual would remain forever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture."
The statement referred to a debt incurred by an act to which the court
applied the criminal statute of limitations, finding that the civil act was
penal in nature. Justice Holmes, in Gompers v. United States,0 used
the words of Adams v. Woods in holding that a theory upon which actions
might be brought at any increment of time would be utterly repugnant
to our laws.
The leading Supreme Court case on the subject is Pendergast v.
United States." There the petitioners had fraudulently testified before
a federal court. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, 2 that court affirmed,
relying on a Nebraska Supreme Court decision.13 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's ruling and found that, al-
though the perjury was criminal contempt under the federal statute
which provided for power in the federal courts to punish contempts com-
mitted in their presence,' 4 the federal criminal statute of limitations"
barred the criminal contempt action. Florida has a similar statute,'6 ex-
cept that all actions except those involving capital crimes are subject to
a two year limitation.
The Pendergast case appears to be the first definite application of the
criminal statutes to criminal contempt cases. Previously, the rule had
been settled that a time limitation would apply to contempts committed
out of the presence of the courts. 7 However, prior ;to Pendergast, the
9. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805).
10. 233 U.S. 604, 613 (1914).
11. 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
12. Pendergast v. United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1943).
13. In State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282 (1937), the
court upheld a criminal contempt sentence which had been maintained after the
running of the statute of limitations applicable to misdemeanors, stating that it
had searched in vain and could find no statute that limited the time in which an
action charging criminal contempt could be maintained. Unless the defendant could
show his rights had been prejudiced, the action was not barred by lapse of time.
The court emphasized that a prosecution for criminal contempt is governed by the
strict rules applicable to criminal prosecutions, and the proceedings are of a criminal
nature. This reasoning is difficult to justify, since the court could simply have
applied the general criminal limitations statute.
14. JUDICIAL CODE § 268, 28 U.S.C. § 385 (1940).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1044 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1964) provides that:
No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless
the indictment is found or the information is instituted within three years next after
such offense shall have been committed.
16. FLA. STAT. § 932.05 (1967) provides that:
All offenses not punishable with death, save as hereinafter provided, shall be
prosecuted within two years after the same shall have been committed . ..
17. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914), approved by United States v. Gold-
man, 277 U.S. 229 (1928).
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federal courts had adhered to the reasonable time doctrine which made
laches rather than limitations a defense to criminal contempt.
Currently it appears that the majority of those states which have
decided the issue hold that a time limitation controls. 8 The Missouri
Supreme Court in Osborne v. Owsley"9 declared that criminal contempt
proceedings are not criminal cases within the meaning of the constitution,
statutes, or case law of Missouri. The case before the court was a felony,
however, and since the statute in the case did not apply to a felony, the
statement in Owsley is dictum. In Brewer v. State,"° the Mississippi court
applied the rule that in constructive contempts, the misdemeanor statutes
of limitations of two years would be adopted by analogy.
Pate v. Toler,2 an Arkansas case, held that the statute of limita-
tions will bar a direct contempt citation. In Beattie v. People2 the
Illinois court was barred by the -statute of limitations from punishing
an attorney for contempt when he had given false testimony in a divorce
action. Kentucky 23 and Washington 4 have held similarly. The New
Jersey court in In re Jibb 5 unanimously overturned a direct contempt
sentence, declaring that where there is concurrent jurisdiction for the
same cause of action, if the legal remedy has been barred by the lapse of
time then the equitable remedy will also be barred.
Although not directly faced with the issue, Alabama impliedly con-
sidered whether the statute of limitations will bar an action for perjury
committed in the presence of the court in a divorce action. In Hartigan
v. Hartigan,21 -the court set aside a divorce decree procured by perjured
testimony. Though the court was highly indignant, it noted that the per-
jurers had immunized themselves from retaliation by waiting for the run-
ning of the statute before asking the court to modify its decree.
May. contempt be issued even after term? The court in Joyce v.
Hick, 2 7 said that a criminal contempt citation may be issued after an
original proceeding has been finally adjudicated. Furthermore, the ter-
mination of the original proceeding will not preclude issuing a citation
based upon acts performed during a legitimate inquiry with respect to
that proceeding. But the question of how long after term a criminal con-
tempt citation may be issued is left unanswered. Bringing this problem
into sharper focus is the scholarly discussion in American Insurance Co.
18. Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 439 (1965); see also Note, Federal Procedure-Applicability
of Statute of Limitations to Contempt Actions, 31 GEo. L.J. 340 (1943).
19. 364 Mo. 544, 264 S.W.2d 332, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822 (1954).
20. 176 Miss. 803, 170 So. 540 (1936).
21. 190 Ark. 465, 79 S.W.2d 444 (1935).
22. 33 Ill. App. 651 (1889).
23. Gordon v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 461, 133 S.W. 206 (1911).
24. State v. Phipps, 174 Wash. 443, 24 P.2d 1073 (1933).
25. 123 N.J. Eq. 251, 197 A. 12 (1938), discussed in Note, Contempt-Application of
Statute of Limitations to Criminal Contempt in Equity, 3 UNiv. NEWARK L.R. 102 (1938).
26. 272 Ala. 67, 128 So.2d 725 (1961).
27. 337 Mass. 118, 147 N.E.2d 187 (1958).
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v. Lucas,28 where the court said that in vacating a decree procured by
bribery, the same court may adopt an appropriate procedure by reopening
the case. If such a power were not present, the court would be powerless
to protect itself against outrageous conduct. By reopening the case two
established rules of public policy are brought into conflict: the desirabil-
ity of finality of decrees after term based on the public policy that there
must be an end to litigation, and the protection of judicial action based on
the public policy that courts of justice must not be used as instruments
to effectuate fraud or injustice. The court said that one rule must give
way to -the other. It stated that before Congress had passed criminal
laws to aid this public policy of protecting the courts, the remedies of
contempt and "unclean hands" had been devised by early Anglo-Saxon
law. The court further stated:
[S]o long as there remains anything which a court can do in
a particular litigation to protect its integrity we think it has the
power to act, provided only, that such action is based upon a
full opportunity for hearing by all interested parties.
American Insurance left unanswered whether a statute of limitations
could prevent the court from exerting its authority to protect its integrity.
When read in the light of the Pendergast rule, American Insurance ap-
pears to be restricted to the applicable federal criminal statute of limita-
tions in its power to vindicate its authority by the use of contempt pro-
ceedings. Thus one finds in the statute of limitations the point where the
public policy of protecting the courts' integrity gives way to that of seek-
ing an end to litigation.
A sampling of cases reveals that judicial decrees may be set aside
for after-discovered fraud perpetrated on the court.29 Furthermore, since
Pendergast, all the federal courts and the majority of state courts which
have decided the point restrict the sui generis action of criminal con-
tempt with a statute of limitations.3 0 Although the precise issue of
whether the statute of limitations applies has not often come before ap-
pellate courts, a vast number of these courts have upheld the setting
aside of prior decrees for extrinsic fraud. The cautious use of the remedy
of contempt is revealed by the relatively few punishments accompanying
these decisions to vacate.
In Bloom v. Illinois8' the petitioner, who was given a two year sen-
tence for criminal contempt for offering a forged will into the probate
court, claimed he was entitled to trial by jury. The Supreme Court of
the United States sustained Bloom's argument, defining criminal con-
28. 38 F. Supp. 926, 932 (D.C. Mo. 1941).
29. Halloran v. Blue and White Liberty Cab Co., 253 Minn. 436, 92 N.W.2d 794
(1958); Goetz v. Gunsch, 80 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1956); Davidson v. Ream, 175 App. Div.
760, 162 N.Y.S. 375 (1916).
30. Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 439 (1965).
31. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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tempt as a crime in the ordinary sense-a public wrong punishable by
fine or imprisonment. The court said that serious contempt was entitled
to the constitutional guaranty of a jury trial, whereas a non-serious con-
tempt would not necessarily be entitled to a jury trial. Whether or not
the criminal contempt was serious would be determined by the severity of
the punishment inflicted by the offended court. Although Bloom's offense
appears to have been indirect criminal contempt, the court specifically
discussed disorders committed in the courtroom (direct criminal con-
tempts). It stated, however, that since they were petty offenses there
would be no problem with the right to jury trial. Thus, the Supreme
Court defines a direct criminal contempt as a crime in the ordinary sense,
entitled to trial by jury if it is not a petty offense.
In the instant case the Third District Court correctly decided that
the defendant was not entitled to trial by jury within the guidelines set
out by Bloom. The court, bound by the mandate of Bloom, said that
there would be no jury trial because the offense was not sufficiently
serious but ignored the definition which was prerequisite to determining
that a jury trial was not warranted, the definition that direct criminal
contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense. Had the court applied this rule
of law, it is not unreasonable to assume that it would have applied the
criminal statute of limitations.32 Since Pendergast and Bloom are appli-
cable to the states, it is submitted that the statute of limitations" must
be applied to both indirect and direct criminal contempt if there is to be
equal protection under the Florida laws.
JOSEPH TEICHMAN
DOG OWNER'S LIABILITY IN NON-BITE SITUATIONS:
DUTY v. CAUSE-BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE
Defendant's male German shepherd was loose in the defendant's
backyard for the purpose of stud service to another defendant's female
shepherd. The backyard was enclosed by a four-foot-high chain link
fence which was parallel with and adjacent to the sidewalk upon which
the plaintiff's twelve-year-old son and two friends were walking. The
dogs charged the fence and barked, frightening the children as they
passed and causing them to run into the street where plaintiff's son was
fatally injured by an oncoming automobile. The circuit court granted
the dog owner's motion for summary judgment. On appeal to the Court
of Appeal for the Third District, held, reversed: A jury should be per-
mitted to determine whether, under the specific facts of this case, the
32. FLA. STAT. § 932.05 (1967).
33. Id.
